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Reflections on the Great Recession of 2008-20091 
 
   Georges de Menil 
   Paris School of Economics 
 
  
 As economists and policy makes ponder the lessons of the last two turbulent years, 
many troubling questions remain. What went wrong? Why did policy makers fail so 
abysmally to take preventative action? Why were economists so completely taken by 
surprise? 
 Some commentators, who consider the principal cause of the Great Recession to 
have been the structure of global macroeconomic imbalances, argue that economists did 
see the problem coming for many years, and repeatedly advocated corrective measures 
which political leaders did not follow. I think this view brushes over increasing and 
inherent weaknesses in developed financial markets, which caused them to become 
excessively vulnerable to collapse. When a shock came, the resulting disruption was 
vastly magnified by these inherent structural weaknesses.  
 Large macroeconomic structural imbalances did clearly impact domestic 
economic conditions in the United States. Whether it was the reflection of insufficient 
saving in the U.S  or excessive saving in Asia, the current account deficit of  the U.S. 
                                                 
1 Remarks prepared for the Asian Economic Panel in Incheon, Korea, March 22 and 23, 2010 
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facilitated the maintenance of low interest rates in that country2. .If the U.S. had not run 
such a large current account deficit, and if Asian central banks had not purchased such 
large amounts of U.S. Treasury obligations, the U.S. authorities might have felt more 
pressure to correct fiscal imbalances, and interest rates might also have been higher.  
  
 In turn, a prolonged period of very low interest rates in the United States 
encouraged many financial professionals to take increasing risk. With interest rates so 
low, and debt so cheap, it was very tempting to go for a home run3. Indeed, low interest 
rates combined with a conscious push by policy makers to favor home ownership for 
everyone, contributed importantly to the housing boom, which became a bubble, and 
eventually burst.  
 But are these macroeconomic developments sufficient to explain what happened? 
Developed countries have experienced bubbles before – the tech bubble, and housing 
bubbles in other countries, for example. Why, in this case, when the bubble burst, did the 
financial system in the United States and Europe collapse so dramatically? The 
magnitude and success (for now) of the rescue operations tends to make one forget the 
depth of the abyss into which global financial markets appeared to be plunging.  
 When one considers the rapidity with which strains in the mortgage markets 
spread through the rest of the system, one can only conclude that the financial system 
itself had fault lines which made it vulnerable to any important failure in any sector of the 
                                                 
2 For a balanced view of the debate over underlying macroeconomic imbalances, see Maurice Obstfeld and 
Kenneth Rogoff, “Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis: Products of Common Causes,” paper 
presented to “Economic Linkages, Spillovers and the Financial Crisis,” a conference in Paris, January 28-
29, 2010, sponsored by the Bank of France Professorship of the Paris School of Economics, and by the IMF.  
3 See G. Rajan Raghuram, “Monetary Policy and Incentives,” Address at the Bank of Spain conference on 
Central Banks in the 21st Century, Madrid, June 8, 2006.  Raghuram discusses the motives investment 
managers may have for increasing the exposure to risk in their portfolios, when risk free interest rates are 
very low for a long time.  
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markets. As mortgage markets dried up, so did markets for automobile loans, credit card 
loans, student loans, etc. The inter-bank market froze; there was almost a run on money 
markets, and bank credit to the economy came to a standstill.   
Why were financial markets in the United States and Europe so vulnerable? What 
made them so interconnected, and so susceptible individually and jointly to seizing up? 
The consensus answer seems to be 1) the complexity of and indeed the flaws in the 
structured products in which so many institutions in Europe and the United States 
invested so heavily, and 2) the startling extent of the use of leverage by these same 
institutions4.  
In any financial system in which institutions borrow short and lend long, the risk 
of a panic is always present. If creditors loose confidence in the ability of banks or money 
funds or hedge funds, they may rush for the exit, and precipitate a liquidity crisis in the 
institutions where they have put their money. This risk is amplified if the assets which the 
short term borrowings have financed are opaque, and if their valuation is extremely 
volatile. The story of 2008 has now been told many times. The problem was not just that 
mortgage loans failed, but that nobody knew how bad the RMBs and CMBs and CDO 
squared were, and nobody knew what the extent of exposure of their counterparties was. 
Financial institutions stopped lending to each other over night, because they had no way 
of estimating how far the problem extended. Leverage ratios of 40 and 50 to 1 
exacerbated the problem many fold. An institution that has a high degree of leverage and 
large short term liabilities needs in a crisis to have assets that it can monetize quickly, and 
                                                 
4 Some global banks concur with this analysis. In a February 2010 report, the research department of one of 
the 15 largest global banks identified excessive leverage and the inherent weaknesses of some structured 
products as the principal reasons for the failure of the financial system. See also the analysis of the French 
banker, Ambroise Laurent, “Le vrai défi,” Commentaire, No.125,  Spring 2009, pp. 25-36. 
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at predictable values. The simultaneous ubiquity of opaque structured products and of 
excessive leverage proved to be a deadly mixture.  
In retrospect, the important question is why did financial practices veer so 
recklessly into this danger zone? Where were the prudent bankers? Where was every 
participant’s instinct for self preservation? Why didn’t the owners of the capital that was 
being put at risk wave red flags?  
Much has been written about incentives and governance. It is now widely 
appreciated that variable compensation schemes which depend on annual targets and 
feature no recapture asymmetrically favor risk taking. The message, “Heads I win, Tails 
you loose,” is loaded. In the United States, the Fed has wisely proposed – and is 
confidant that it has the necessary authority – to bring compensation schemes into the 
purview of its surveillance. Moves are also afoot in the United States and elsewhere to 
increase the voice of shareholders. This is an important development for non-financial as 
well as financial corporations.  
But incentives are not everything. When Bear Stearns was sold for $10, its CEO 
owned 6% of the firm. When Lehman filed for bankruptcy, Richard Fuld and other top 
executives had an overwhelming share of their wealth invested in the firm. In both cases, 
management’s interests were very much aligned with those of share holders. And, 
nonetheless, management accelerated as it headed for the wall. 
Fuld and many others firmly believed that what was happening could not happen, 
that their strategies were the right ones, and that the storm would pass. They were 
convinced that the structured products that they had promoted and invested heavily in 
were the wave of the future, and that their risk management procedures protected them 
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from default5. One of the surprising aspects of the financial crisis of 2008 was the degree 
to which the principal actors, and in fact large segments of the informed public, were 
convinced of the intelligence, validity and soundness of the very practices that nearly 
brought the system to ruin.  
Economists bear a large part of the responsibility for that illusion6. The problem 
was not so much that their analyses were wrong, but that they abandoned reasonable 
skepticism about their conclusions. Much has been made of the fact that the econometric 
models which investment banks, insurance companies, and rating agencies used to value 
complex CDOs were misleading or inadequate7. They did not take sufficient account of 
fat tails, correlations, and confidence intervals. These are serious shortfalls for a model. 
But more serious yet was the blind faith that the executives in charge put in the model 
results.  
Much has also been made of the degree to which the perfect market paradigm was 
over sold. As hypotheses on how markets function, many of its tenets are useful tools of 
analysis. CAPM and its progeny have transformed the thinking of financial professionals, 
and increased the acumen and the logic of their analyses. In that sense, the assumption of 
perfect markets was not wrong; it was useful for certain purposes, but not for all purposes. 
                                                 
5 Andrew Ross Sorkin gives a gripping account of the unswerving belief of the top management of Lehman 
until the bitter end in the validity of its business model, in Too Big to Fail, Viking Press, 2009.  
6 The economics profession has begun to take stock of the extent to which it contributed to the Great 
Recession. See Daron Acemoglu, “The Crisis of 2008: structural lessons for and from economists,” Centre 
for Economic Policy Research, Policy Insight No. 28, January, 2009; Luigi Spaventa, “Economists and 
Economics: what does the crisis tells us?” Policy Insight No. 38, August, 2009; Paul Krugman, “How did 
Economists Get It so Wrong?” New York Times Magazine, September 2, 2009. I argue that it is not so 
much our teachings as our loss of critical perspective which contributed to the crisis. See also Francis 
Fukuyama and Seth Colby, “What were they thinking? The role of economists in the financial debacle,” 
The American Interest, Fall, 2009, for a scathing criticism by non-economists.  
7 For a critique of the pitfalls of simulation analyses of CDOs, see Joshua Coval, Jakub Jurek and Erik 
Stafford, “The Economics of Structured Finance,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2009. 
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As every philosopher of science knows, any model is a simplification, a powerful tool for 
thinking through aspects of a problem, but a tool to be used with circumspection.  
Some economists indeed made a leap of faith, and argued that the perfect model 
hypothesis was the most powerful tool the profession had for analyzing all important 
problems8. That view was not held unanimously. But the believers did convince a large 
fraction of opinion makers and political leaders of the power of their argument.  
Our profession was also the purveyor of another, broader and more subtle 
message – namely that we knew how to model the world, that there were no markets, no 
developments that we could not, with proper care, understand and analyze.  
For the twenty years that preceded the Great Recession, this view of the world 
seemed to be confirmed by global macroeconomic developments. The United States and 
Europe experienced, with short interruptions, steady non-inflationary growth. In Asia, the 
financial crisis of 1997-1998 was a more transformational experience. But if one steps 
back and looks at global trends, what one sees is that stock markets occasionally crashed, 
but each time non-inflationary growth recovered quickly in the United States and Europe. 
These were the decades of the Great Moderation9. In these Panglossian times, it was only 
too easy to accept the assurances of our profession that there were no economic problems 
that could not be solved, and that depressions and inflations were a thing of the past. 
Rational leaders who understood economics could be counted on to ensure growth and 
stability.  
                                                 
8 The strongest statement of this view is that of  Michael Jensen in 1978, “…there is no proposition in 
economics which has more solid empirical evidence supporting it than the Efficient Markets Hypothesis.”  
“Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency,” Journal of Financial Economics, 
June/September, 1978. 
9 For a discussion of the drop in macroeconomic volatility from 1985 through 2007, see Roger W. Ferguson, 
Jr., Philipp Hartmann, Fabio Panetta and Richard Portes, International Financial Stability, ICMB and CEPR, 
Geneva Reports on the World Economy, No. 9, 2007, particularly chapter 5. 
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The problem with this rosy view is that it allows and encourages people to put 
down their guard. If macroeconomic stability could be taken for granted, if the world was 
indeed becoming increasingly less risky, then previous precaution could be neglected. If 
all bets could be expected to succeed, there was no downside to taking on more leverage. 
And the complex instruments designed by the technicians of modern finance could be 
initiated, sold and purchased without hesitation. Thus did economists themselves 
contribute to the excesses which eventually caused the system nearly to crash. There were 
a few nay sayers – Cassandra’s like Nouriel Roubini10, but also a few hedge fund 
managers like John Paulson, who saw the dangers, and in Paulson’s case, made bets on 
the collapse which eventually came through. The global economy and the reputation of 
the economics profession would be stronger today if there had been more actors like 
Roubini and John Paulson.  
 
 
Now that roughly a year and a half has passed since the crash and the Great 
Bailout, where do we stand? Economic conditions and policy issues are radically 
different in the developed and developing worlds. The balance of this essay will address 
first the situation in the United States and Europe, and then, in conclusion, the situation in 
emerging Asia. 
In the United States and Europe, the legacy of the Great Recession of 2008 and 
2009 is one of asset destruction, fear, massive public deficits and unprecedented levels of 
                                                 
10 “On Sept. 7, 2006, Nouriel Roubini, an economics professor at New York University, stood before an 
audience of economists at the International Monetary Fund and announced that a crisis was brewing. In the 
coming months and years, he warned, the United States was likely to face a once-in-a-lifetime housing bust, 
an oil shock, sharply declining consumer confidence and, ultimately, a deep recession.” Stephen Mihm, “Dr. 
Doom,” New York Times Magazine, August 15, 2008. 
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public debt. The crisis may not in fact be over. The destruction of private asset values 
remains so massive that it is difficult to see where the demand – without which there 
cannot be a durable recover – will come from. The public authorities, which through their 
interventions forestalled a worse crisis, are now themselves struggling with excessive 
debt. The tension surrounding the debt of Greece is a potential harbinger of worse things 
to come. Budgetary consolidation is an urgent priority around the world. If political 
resistance causes delay, a public debt crisis may become inevitable. Consolidation may 
not begin in earnest until there has been another panic, this one focused on the state of 
public finances.  
Given this depressed outlook, there is no chance that any major financial 
institution in the developed world will soon repeat the excesses of the beginning of this 
century. Neither Citibank, nor Bank of America, nor Royal Bank of Scotland, nor even 
Deutsche Bank is likely to take uncalculated risks anytime in the next decade. 
So do we need regulatory reform? The question is rhetorical, because political 
pressures are such that reform is going to happen whether we need it or not. There is 
irresistible political mileage to be made in every country in the developed world from 
bashing financial institutions. The question should perhaps rather be: since we are going 
to have regulatory reform, what should its focus be?  
Regulatory reform is certainly needed at a minimum to ensure that existing rules 
are not thwarted. Our present structure of competing jurisdictions, both nationally and 
internationally, is characterized by gaping loopholes through which many of the villains 
of 2008 – 2009 blithely charged. The AIG catastrophe is an example of a US based 
insurance company avoiding US insurance regulations by developing what proved to be a 
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very risky business in London, where it slipped through the cracks. Another example is 
Lehman’s ability to use the Repo 105 rule artificially to raise its apparent liquidity, by 
getting a London law firm to approve what no US lawyers were willing to approve11. In 
2004, the threat of regulatory arbitrage helped the investment banks of Wall St., among 
them Lehman and Merrill Lynch, to convince the SEC to raise their ceilings on leverage 
to what subsequently proved to be dangerous levels12. Within the European Union, the 
jurisdictional obstacles to financial surveillance are surrealistic.  
Eliminating loopholes within any one country is feasible, if the political will to do 
so exists. Getting national authorities to agree to coordinate their regulations is another 
matter. If it is one of the most important priorities for regulatory reform, it is sadly also 
the most difficult to achieve. One has to hope that the political momentum which seems 
to exist now will not be wasted.  
Other specific institutions and markets call for enhanced and improved regulation. 
It is important that bank capital requirements be made counter-cyclical rather than pro-
cyclical. Rating agencies need attention. There is a need for institutions and regulations to 
ensure transparency and a level playing field in the trading of some new financial 
products -- CDSs and other derivatives.  
Beyond international coordination, the most challenging aspect of the regulatory 
agenda is how to deal with what has come to be known as the “too big to fail” problem.  
In the last two decades, global financial markets have experienced a sequence of 
major crises -- the Mexican Peso crisis (1994), the Asian Crisis (1997),  LTCM (1998), 
                                                 
11 Meghan Murphy and Michael Peel, “Elite London law firm faces fall out from Repo 105,” Financial 
Times, March 13, 2010. See also Jennifer Hughes, “Fooled Again,” Financial Times, March 19, 2010. 
12 Stephen Labaton, “Agency’s ’04 Rule let Banks Pile up New Debt and Risk,” New York Times, October 
3, 2008. 
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and the current crisis – in which each time public authorities stepped in to guarantee 
certain institutions, provide conditional finance to others, and, nationalize still others, one 
way or another, avoiding the complete implosion of markets. Over time, the sums that 
had to be deployed grew. Private decision makers can not be faulted if what they learned 
from this is that there are no risks that the public authorities will not cover in order to 
avoid collapse.  
Economists rightly focus on the moral hazard generated by these implicit 
guarantees. This problem haunted decision makers during the Fall of 2008. If the Fed 
partially guaranteed the toxic assets of Bear Stearns and saved its counterparties, what 
would other players think? In the case of Lehman Brothers, the authorities felt they had 
no alternative but to let it fail, and may also have hoped that the example would 
discipline institutions that had gone too far. Paradoxically, the fall out from the failure of 
this institution – which was neither gigantic, nor a bank – was so catastrophic that 
authorities in the United States and Europe had to rush to implement the biggest package 
of bailouts in history. And, non one should have any illusion; the survivors read between 
the lines that they would all be saved. I happen to have been attending the presentation of 
a new fund by the CEO of a major, highly leveraged and troubled private equity firm in 
New York shortly after the US Congress passed TARP. One of his first remarks was, 
“Well, now we know that we will all still be here at the end of the day.”  One could not 
invent a clearer expression of moral hazard.13 
                                                 
13 The research department of a major, global bank estimates, in the study mentioned in n. 4,the value of the 
implicit guarantee which the largest banks in Europe and the United States regularly receive under current 
circumstances as a result of being “too big to fail.”  The bank’s estimate is between $20 and $30 billion per 
year.     
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But the deeper problem is size and concentration.  If there were hundreds of 
different institutions, each following a different strategy and each with a different view of 
the world, .the authorities would have no reason to hesitate to allow one or a few of them 
to fail because they had made bad bets. But if a few giant institutions dominate the 
markets -- or if one or more of them, not necessarily giants, have a strategically important 
position at a vital node in the relationships among many other participants-- then letting 
one of these fail is tantamount to letting the financial system as a whole crash.  
Unfortunately, changing the size and the composition of the players in global 
financial markets is a tall order. It is almost impossible to do by any single sweep of 
legislation. If it is to happen, it will have to happen progressively, over time.  
The Volker rule is not the answer. The idea of the rule is that commercial banks 
would be prohibited from engaging in high risk activities – like proprietary trading of 
derivatives and in house promotion of private equity or hedge funds14. These activities 
would be pushed into “casino” banks, whose liquidity would not be guaranteed by any 
public authorities. The trouble with the rule is that it pushes much of modern finance into 
the casinos, beyond the reach of the authorities. In 2008-2009, the most spectacular 
failures and bail-outs involved non-banks (Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, Lehman, AIG…). 
Unfettered, casino finance would thrive, and the more it grew, the more one could be sure 
to find systemic risks among its number.  
For a public body to be in a position to take actions that sanction institutions that 
threaten systemic stability, without itself precipitating a general collapse of markets, it 
must have authority over all institutions of systemic importance. It is illusory to think that 
                                                 
14Statement of Paul A. Volker before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affaires of the 
United States Senate, February 2, 2010.  
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it could allow a systemically important institution to collapse simply because that 
institution had excluded itself from the authority’s control.   
Paradoxically, in Europe -- where almost all banks are universal banks, and are 
likely to remain so – the authorities could be in a better position to control systemic risk 
than in the United States, where universal banking is less firmly established, and might 
indeed recede if the Volker rule is implemented. Where universal banking prevails, the 
banking institutions which take on more risk are just as subject to regulatory control as 
the plain vanilla banks.  
The authority which it is most important for a regulator monitoring systemic risk 
to have is the authority to seize and break up a problem institution. This would mean, in 
the case of a giant bank which had failed, to separate the pieces and require each to stand 
alone. The natural tendency, in the midst of a crisis, when a regulatory authority is bailing 
out an institution, is towards consolidation. Very often, the regulator, under pressure to 
stop contagion, divides up the pieces of the failed institution and distributes them to its 
surviving competitors. The result is more not less concentration. To resist this tendency, 
authorities will need a lot of imagination, will have to be prepared well in advance, and 
will have to display considerable political courage. Some form of pre-arranged 
liquidation procedures may be the answer, but they clearly should not be drawn up by the 
interested parties themselves15.  
Advance planning is necessary. But we should not delude ourselves. It is unlikely 
to be sufficient to forestall the next crisis, when it eventually comes. If the threat of being 
wiped out did not deter the manager-owners of the institutions that plunged to their 
                                                 
15 See the discussion in Beatrice Weber di Mauro and Ulrich Kluh, “Reshaping Systemic Risk Regulation 
in Europe,” manuscript which draws on a proposal put forward in the German Council of Economic 
Advisors’ Annual Report of October 2009. 
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demise in 2008-2009, the threat of being broken up is not likely to stop them next time. 
What is important is that regulators be given the authority now to break up the failed 
giants next time. That way, and perhaps only that way, will global financial markets 
evolve towards more stable structures.  
We should also not be under the illusion that more competitive, less concentrated 
global financial structures will be immune to bouts of collective excess. It is important to 
remember that as the current crisis developed, almost all the major actors - - including the 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury and the U.K. 
Chancellor of the Exchequer -- believed unconditionally in the myth that brought the 
house down.  
In closing, I would like to comment about financial markets in emerging Asia.  
Emerging Asia, like Europe, is far from homogeneous, and comments which may be 
appropriate in one case may be completely off the mark in another. Nonetheless, there are 
two simple points that deserve to be made. 
The first concerns initial conditions.  
One can observe in the literature and in the public debate, a certain degree of 
backlash against the liberalization movement and the faith in markets which 
characterized the previous twenty years. This is in part a natural reaction to the 
overselling of the perfect market paradigm. It is also a response to the crisis itself. 
Though I have argued that regulation failure was far from the whole problem, it was 
clearly part of the problem. A new literature is emerging, which purports to connect the 
origin of the crisis and also its incidence, with openness, private ownership, and 
international competition in financial markets. It is still unclear how this literature relates 
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to the older theme that financial openness may cause instability in the short term, but 
promotes economic development in the long term16.    
It is also factually true that financial institutions in emerging Asia were, by and 
large, spared direct involvement in the activities that proved so destabilizing in developed 
markets. They did not originate and did not purchase significant amounts of structured 
products. In addition, their short-term foreign currency indebtedness was moderate, and 
the authorities in these countries held very large foreign currency reserves, available to be 
used as a buffer against exogenous shocks.  
The knowledge that they have averted the worst of the storm, and that opinion 
leaders in the developed world are questioning the merits of unbridled liberalization and 
openness, may easily lead decision makers in Asia to conclude that the push for financial 
liberalization of recent years was misguided, and should be halted or reversed.  
My comment on this view is that its validity depends a lot on where you stand. If 
your initial conditions, particularly as relates to financial markets, are those of completely 
open, liberalized and deregulated markets, then, indeed, it may be wise for your 
authorities to pause and concentrate on effective implementation of the regulations that 
they have. But if your initial conditions are those of a completely closed and state-owned 
financial system, then some degree of prudent liberalization may be an important priority. 
This leads me to my second point. It is obvious that the best way to avoid a 
banking crisis entirely is not to have a banking system. If volatility of any kind is to be 
avoided at all cost, that may be a model to pursue. One should not be surprised if it tends 
                                                 
16 G.J. Caprio and P. Honohan, “Banking Policy and Macroeconomic Stability – an exploration,” Policy 
Research Working Paper Series, 2856, The World Bank, 2002. 
 15
to repress private consumption and encourage corruption. The most problematic aspect of 
the model may be that, in today’s globalized world it is destined to break down.   
What one hopes is that the leaders who make financial policy in emerging 
countries will learn from the mistakes of their peers in developed countries, without 
rejecting wholesale the potential benefits of free markets.  
 
